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"For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified,
and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical
or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on
self-protection or self-promotion." -Justice Potter Stewart,
Abstract: Due to increased concern for national security, critics have
argued that agencies are unnecessarily allowing access to documents
that could be used in future terrorist attacks. In response to such
concerns, agencies have secretively and steadily removed thousands of
declassified documents from the public purview and reclassified them.
Some of these documents have been in the public domain for more
than three decades.
Reclassification of information in the public domain undermines
the policy aims underlying the Freedom of Information Act;
reclassification deters public access to necessary and useful
information and is unlikely to prevent a determined terrorist from
accessing such information. This comment argues that the legal bases
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that permit agencies to remove such information from the public
domain need to be restricted in the form of increased agency
accountability, judicial oversight, and legislative amendment.
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I. INTRODUCTION: COLD WAR MISSILE BLACKOUT
The National Security Archive ("Archive") is an independent
research institute and library located at George Washington
University that collects and publishes declassified documents
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").2 In
August 2006, the Archive reported that the Pentagon and Department
of Energy had started designating as "secret" information about the
Cold War that for many years had been disclosed to the public,
including Cold War enemy, the former Soviet Union.3 The
information subject to the blackout included the numbers of strategic
weapons, including Minuteman, Titan II, and other missiles in the
U.S. nuclear arsenal during the Cold War.4 As the legal basis for such
reclassifications, the agencies cited Exemption 1 of FOA (the national
security exemption), claiming that such disclosures posed a danger to
national security.5
Over the years, FOIA fostered openness between the United States
government and its citizens, journalists, and private organizations. 6
However, the events of September 11, 2OOl have caused an executive
reassessment of the government's disclosure of information,
specifically disclosures made pursuant to FOIA requests.7 As agencies
2 NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2006), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/2005%2oAnnual%2OReport.pdf.
3 Christopher Lee, Cold War Missiles Target of Blackout, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2006, at
Ai.
4 See William Burr, How Many and Where Were the Nukes? What the U.S. Government
No Longer Wants You to Know about Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War (Aug. 18,
2006), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/index.htm (showing the
juxtaposition of documents released more than 30 years ago without the redactions found
on the same documents released in 2006).
5 Id.; see also Lee, supra note 3.
6 DAVID DADGE, CASUALTY OF WAR: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S ASSAULT ON FREE PRESS
148 (2004); CHARLES S. STEINBERG, THE INFORMATION ESTABLISHMENT: OUR GOVERNMENT
AND THE MEDIA 20 (1980).
7 Compare Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of All
Departments and Agencies, The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/o4foia/o11o12.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], and
Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Action to Safeguard Information
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive Documents Related to
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began damming the flow of information to the public, they also began
reclassifying already public information under Exemption 1.8
The Archive's report about the Cold War missile blackout is one of
the many recent examples of an agency reclassifying information
already in the public domain.9 Despite agency assertions that these
reclassifications have been in the interest of national security, there is
increasing concern that they are simply the result of unnecessary
secrecy.10 In an interview with the Washington Post, William Burr, a
senior analyst at the Archive, said, "It would be difficult to find more
dramatic examples of unjustifiable secrecy than these decisions to
classify the numbers of U.S. strategic weapons. The Pentagon is now
trying to keep secret numbers of strategic weapons that have never
been classified before."11
Executive fears that FOIA requests will lead to the dangerous
disclosure of national secrets are not new. Since FOIA's inception,12
there has been a constant struggle to balance the public's need to
Homeland Security (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2002foiapostlo.htm [hereinafter Card Memorandum], with Memorandum from Janet
Reno, Attorney General, to Heads of Departments and Agencies, The Freedom of
Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/reno.html
[hereinafter Reno Memorandum].
8 See, e.g., Burr, supra note 4; OMB Watch, Access to Government Information Post
September xlth, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/213/1/104 (last visited
Mar. 28, 2oo8) (tracking information removed from agency websites after September
lith); THE REPORTER'S COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOMEFRONT
CONFIDENTIAL: HOW THE WAR ON TERRORISM AFFECTS ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE
PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 59 (2005) [hereinafter HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL].
9 See DADGE, supra note 6, at 146-51; Susan Nevelow Mart, Let the People Know the
Facts: Can Government Information Removed from the Internet be Reclaimed?, 98 LAW.
LIBR. J. 7, 15 (2oo6) (citing examples where the Environmental Protection Agency and
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have improperly used national security as an
excuse to remove information from the public's reach); William J. Broad, U.S. is
TYghtening Rules on Keeping Scientific Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,2002, at Al.
lo See Burr, supra note 4; HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, supra note 8; HAROLD C. RELYEA,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SECRECY VERSUS OPENNESS: NEW PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS FOR
BALANCING COMPETING NEEDS 1 (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21895.pdf; Ted Bridis, LBJ Had Doubts about the Freedom
of Information Act, HOUSTON CHRON., July 4, 2006, at AiS; Leonard Pitts Jr., Editorial,
Pursuit of Top Secret' Goes Way Over the Top, BALT. SUN, Aug. 27, 2oo6, at A23.
11 Lee, supra note 3.
12 A full text of the Freedom of Information Act can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
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know with the nation's security interests. 13 When President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed FOIA into law forty years ago,14 he did so despite deep
reservations that the Act might result in the disclosure of secrets that
might eventually harm the country.15 In fact, President Johnson
almost used a pocket veto before ultimately buckling under pressure
from journalists and other FOIA supporters.16  The events of
September 11th have only complicated this struggle for balance.7
To allow for these concerns, FOIA contains certain exemptions
that give agencies the power to deny the disclosure of certain types of
information. I In a majority of the recent reclassifications, agencies
have claimed Exemption 1 as the legal basis for denying whole
requests or redacting classified information from documents before
they are disclosed.9 Exemption I of FOIA provides that an agency is
not required to disclose documents that are (a) specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in
13 FOIA Hearing: Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform, lo9th Cong. 1
(2006) [hereinafter FOIA Hearing] (opening statement of Todd Russell Platts, Chairman
of Committee on Government Reform).
1 When FOIA was initially introduced during the Moss hearings, it featured some
interesting role reversals, with then-Congressman Donald Rumsfeld as a FOIA supporter
and then-White House aide Bill Moyers as a FOIA opponent. National Security Archive,
Freedom of Information at 40, July 4, 2006, available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/index.htm [hereinafter Freedom ofInformation at 40].
15 Id.
16 Id. In addition to signing the bill, Johnson issued a signing statement that undercut the
thrust of the law. Before being released to the public, a portion of the statement was
changed from saying "democracy works best when the people know what their government
is doing" to "[d]emocracy works best when the people have all the information that the
security of the nation will permit." Posting of Brian Montopoli to Public Eye,
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2oo6/o7/o5/publiceye/entry177 53 5 8.shtml (July 5,
2006, io:i8 EST).
17 FOJA Hearing, supra note 13.
'8 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9). For a more expansive discussion of Exemptions 2-9, see P.
STEPHEN GIDIERE III, THE FEDERAL INFORMATION MANUAL: HOW THE GOVERNMENT
COLLECTS, MANAGES, AND DISCLOSES INFORMATION UNDER FOIA AND OTHER STATUTES
219-95 (2oo6), and Thomas M. Susman & Harry A. Hammitt, Business Uses of the
Freedom of Information Act, 14-3rd Corp. Prac. Series (BNA), at A-5 to -8 (2004).
19 See, e.g., OMB Watch, supra note 8 (tracking information removed from agency websites
after September 11th); HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, supra note 8, at 6o; Burr, supra note 4.
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the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (b) are properly
classified pursuant to such Executive Order.20
For years, Exemption 1 has given the nation's Executive the power
to decide what should and should not be released to the public.21 Even
when FOIA was enacted, critics worried about the broad strokes of
power FOIA granted to the Executive to make such decisions.22 Yet,
even today, there is virtually no external control over the executive
privilege to make classification decisions.23
This comment will argue that reclassifying documents already
released to the public does not serve national security interests and
only fosters government secrecy, in direct conflict with the policy and
goals of FOIA. The problem created by improper reclassification is
the result of a combination of factors, including inadequate safeguards
against reclassifications within the governing Executive Order,
insufficient oversight of agency reclassification decisions, and
consistent, yet misplaced, judicial deference to Exemption 1 decisions.
In order to stop this constant undermining of FOIA's policy goals,
strict restrictions must be placed on the executive branch's authority
to reclassify publicly disclosed information. Part II of this comment
will discuss the perpetual struggle to balance disclosure and national
security, specifically the history of Exemption 1, the classification
procedures under Executive Order 13,292, and the recent change in
executive disclosure philosophies. Part III discusses the need to
impose strict restrictions on the executive's authority to reclassify
documents already released to the public. Specifically, it will discuss
the inadequacy of Executive Order 13,292 in addressing this specific
issue, the judiciary's concerns about the executive's authority to
reclassify documents already in the public domain, and policy reasons
20 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006).
21 STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 17-18.
22 Id.
23 Too Many Secrets: Overclassification as a Barrier to Critical Information Sharing:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int7 Relations of
the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, lo8th Cong. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Too Many Secrets]
(statement of J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office,
National Archives and Records Administration); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2005) (asserting that courts must accord substantial weight to an
agency's affidavit concerning classifications, especially in national security cases, in which
the agency "possesses necessary expertise to assess the risk of disclosure," and judges "lack
the expertise necessary to second-guess ... agency opinions."). See also GIDIERE, supra
note 18, at 77.
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for imposing strict restrictions on reclassification procedures. Finally,
Part IV will provide suggestions for restricting the executive authority
when it makes reclassification decisions.
II. DISCLOSURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: PERPETUALLY AT ODDS
A. HISTORY OF EXEMPTION 1 AND ITS
GOVERNING EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Virtually every president since Lyndon B. Johnson has expressed
fears that FOIA could lead to the disclosure of secrets harmful to the
country. After an 11 year debate,24 the bill that was eventually signed
by Johnson in 1966 contained nine loosely-phrased exemptions.25
Exemption 1 was premised on the so-called executive authority over
national security matters, a concept articulated by the Supreme Court,
derived from the constitutional provisions set forth in Article II,
Section 11.26 Specifically, Exemption 1 provided that FOIA did not
apply to information that was "specifically required by Executive
Order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or
foreign policy."27 Predictably, the loose language of these
exemptions-particularly Exemption 1-was immediately seized upon
by federal agencies as a reason for denying FOIA requests, even
though the information did not necessarily fall within the claimed
exemption.28  Thus, while FOIA appeared to be revolutionary
legislation, in practice, there was little change in actual agency
disclosure.29
24Freedom of Information at 40, supra note 14 (outlining the debate over FOIA, which
began with hearings in 1955, led by FOTA's primary backer California Congressman John
E. Moss and ended with President Johnson signing the Act into law on July 4,1966).
25 STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 18; Freedom of Information Act, 90 Pub. L. No. 23,
§ 552(b)(1)-(9), 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1974) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2006)).
26 See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527(1988); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
275 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2006).
28 STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 18.
29 Id. at 17. "The passage of the 1966 Freedom of Information Act... unfortunately was
without any real power because of certain provisions and exceptions that gave federal
agencies a ready excuse for continuing to classify information."
2008]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
After the United States Supreme Court decision in EPA v. Mink,3o
which upheld the EPA's refusal to disclose its concededly unclassified
reports on underground nuclear tests in Alaska, it became apparent
that the 1966 Act needed to be revised.31 Despite immense pressure
from federal agencies, Congress adopted several amendments to FOIA
in 1974 over President Gerald Ford's veto.32 Among the many changes
to FOIA was a complete revamp of Exemption 1. The new Exemption
1, which has remained intact since the 1974 Amendment, requires the
Executive Order to set forth specific criteria for classifying
information as secret; it also requires that documents withheld by an
agency be "in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
Order."33
Although the 1974 Amendment to Exemption 1 requires more
specific classification procedures and requires documents to be
properly classified according to those procedures, courts give the
executive branch substantial deference in its classification decisions.34
This approach by the judiciary, combined with Congressional inaction,
has left the executive branch largely unchecked in matters relating to
classified information.35
Historically, classification procedures under Executive Orders
have changed as presidential philosophies on governmental
transparency have changed.36  President William J. Clinton's
Executive Order 12,958 ("Clinton Order") was the most liberal of the
Executive Orders pertaining to the Act; it promoted openness by
creating an automatic declassification system and placing time limits
on classification designations.37 After the Clinton Order was issued,
3o EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-93 (1973) (holding that Exemptions 1 and 5 were sufficient
grounds for the EPA's non-disclosure of the requested information).
31 STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 19.
32 Id.
33 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2oo6).
34 See infra Part III.B.
35 GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 72.
36 Id. at 226.
37 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995), as amended Exec. Order
No. 13,142, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,o89 (Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Clinton Order]. See also
GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 79.
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the amount of information declassified by federal agencies drastically
increased.38 However, the amount of information declassified has
dramatically declined after 2001.39 Agency classification procedures
are currently promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 13,292 ("Bush
Order"), issued by President George W. Bush on March 25, 2003, as
an amendment to the Clinton Order.4O
Overall, the number of decisions made by agencies to classify
information has consistently and rapidly risen since the Bush Order
took effect.41 To date, Exemption 1 is frequently cited by agencies that
handle significant amounts of classified data, and since 1996, some
agencies have increased the overall citation of this exemption as a
basis for denying information.42 For example, in 2000, the
Department of State cited Exemption 1 on three hundred and forty-
nine occasions.43 Compare this to 2005, when the Department of
State cited Exemption 1 on five hundred and three occasions-a 44%
increase over the five year period.44
38 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 1995 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (Sept. 16, 1996), available
at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/1995-annual-report.html ("Under the systematic
review program, agencies reviewed 25,108,258 pages of historically valuable records-89
percent more than in fiscal year 1994-and declassified 23,538,887 pages-lo9 percent
more than in fiscal year 1994.").
39 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2002 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 26 (June 30, 2003),
available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2002-annual-report.pdf ("During FY
2002, the executive branch declassified 44,365,711 pages of permanently valuable
historical records. This figure represents a 56 percent decrease from that reported for FY
2OOl, and the largest decrease since Executive Order 12958 became effective on October
14, 1995.").
40 See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 § 1.1 (Mar. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Bush
Order]. For a brief synopsis of the Bush Order's classification criteria, see infra note 46-
50 and accompanying 
text.
41 GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 72-73.
42 Id. at 223. Agencies that process large amounts of classified information include the
Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense.
INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2005 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 9 (May 26, 2oo6), available
at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/report/2oo5-annual-report.pf.
43 DEP'T OF STATE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FISCALYEAR 2000 7-8
(2001). Annual FOIA reports for all departments and agencies from 1998 to 2005 are
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/o4foia/o4_6.html.
44 DEP'T OF STATE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2005 6-7
(2o6).
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B. CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES UNDER THE BUSH ORDER
In the Opening Statement of Executive Order 13,292, President
Bush acknowledged the important goals served by FOIA, but stressed
the importance of national security:
Our democratic principles require that the American people
be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our
Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information.
Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national defense
has required that certain information be maintained in
confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic
institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions
with foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our
Nation's security remains a priority.45
Under the Bush Order, information can be classified only if it meets
four requirements. First, the information must be classified by an
original classification authority.46 Original classification authorities
include the president, vice president, agency heads and officials
designated by the president, and government officials who have had
such authority delegated to them.47 Second, the information must be
owned or produced by the U.S. government.48 Third, the information
must fall within at least one of eight categories:
(a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
(b) foreign government information;
(c) intelligence activities . . . , sources or methods, or
cryptology;
(d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States,
including confidential sources;
45 Bush Order, supra note 40.
46 Id. § 1.1(a)(i).
47 Id. § 1.3.
48 Id. § 1.1(a)(2).
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(e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to
the national security, which includes defense against
transnational terrorism;
(f) United States Government programs for safeguarding
nuclear materials or facilities;
(g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
infrastructures, projects, plans or protection services relating
to the national security, which includes defense against
transnational terrorism; or
(h) weapons of mass destruction. 49
And fourth, the original authorizer must determine that the
unauthorized disclosure of the information could reasonably be
expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes
defense against transnational terrorism, and the classification
authority is able to identify or describe the potential damage.50
Although these general classification standards are largely similar
to those found in the Clinton Order, some amendments allow more
information to be classified.1 First, the Bush Order broadens the
definition of national security by including "defense against
transnational terrorism."52 The Order also adds a new class of
information that can be classified with the addition of "weapons of
mass destruction" to Section 1.4 of the Order.53 In addition, the Bush
Order creates a presumption that the unauthorized disclosure of
foreign government information4 will cause damage to the national
49 Id. § 1.4.
50 Id. § 1.1(a)(4).
5' See GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 79-82.
52 Compare Clinton Order, supra note 37, §§ 1.2(a)(4), 1.5(e), 1.5(g), with Bush Order,
supra note 40, §§ 1.1(a)(4), 1.4(e), 1.4(g). Terrorism is considered transnational when "an
incident in one country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments, or
citizens of another country." WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF TERRORISM 7 (2006).
53 Compare Clinton Order, supra note 37, § 1.5 with Bush Order, supra note 40, § 1.4.
54 "Foreign Government Information" is defined as:
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security,55 and removes Section 1.2(b) of the Clinton Order, which
prohibited the classification of information when there was
"significant doubt" as to whether the information needed to be
classified.56
In addition to these initial classification procedures, the Bush
Order provided for the automatic declassification of documents that
were more than twenty-five years old and had permanent historical
value on December 31, 2006, regardless of whether the information
had been reviewed57 This December 31, 2006 deadline was a three-
and-a-half year extension of the deadline originally set in the Clinton
Order.58 Despite this deadline, there are numerous exemptions that
an agency can claim to either prevent automatic declassification or
extend the deadline for compliance.59 As of November 2004,
automatic declassification led to the declassification of more than 982
million pages.60 In a July 2007 report to the House Committee on
Intelligence, J. William Leonard, Director of the Information Security
(i) information provided to the United States Government by a foreign government or
governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof,
with the expectation that the information, the source of the information, or both, are
to be held in confidence;
(2) information produced by the United States Government pursuant to or as a result
of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or an international
organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information,
the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence; or
(3) information received and treated as "foreign government information" under the
terms of a predecessor order.
Bush Order, supra note 40, § 6.i(r).
5s Bush Order, supra note 40, § 1.1(c).
56 Compare Clinton Order, supra note 37, § 1.2(b), with Bush Order, supra note 40.
57 Bush Order, supra note 40, § 3.3(a).
58 Clinton Order, supra note 37, § 3.4 (setting the date for automatic declassification to be
"within five years from the date of this order," which was later amended by Clinton to read
"within six and one half years form the date of this order"). See also GIDIERE, supra note
18, at 83.
9 See Bush Order, supra note 40, § 3.3; GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 82-87.
6 0 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF
DECLASSIFICATION IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (Nov. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2004-declassification-report.html.
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Oversight Office, reported that approximately 257 million documents
have been declassified as a result of pursuant automatic
declassification procedures found in the two previous executive
orders. 61
Finally, the Bush Order outlined prohibitions and limitations on
classification. Section 1.7 prohibits classification that attempts to "(1)
conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2)
prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3)
restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of
information that does not require protection in the interest of national
security." 62 This section also prohibits the reclassification of
information that has already been declassified and released to the
public under proper authority unless: (i) action to reclassify is taken
by the personal authority of the agency head or deputy agency head,
who determines in writing that the reclassification of the information
is necessary in the interest of national security; (2) the information
may reasonably be recovered; and (3) the reclassification action is
promptly reported to the Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office. 63 In the Clinton Order, there was no exception that
permitted the reclassification of information that had already been
declassified and released to the public. 64
While the Bush Order does not completely reverse the movement
toward further disclosure initiated by the Clinton Order, the changes
in it have slowed its progress, by delaying the automatic
61 Formal Statement of J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight
Office, Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, Subcomm. on
Intelligence Community Management lo (July 12, 2007), available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/Leonardo 7 2o 7 .pdf. Leonard also reported:
"During FY 2oo6, the Executive branch declassified 37,647,993 pages of permanently
valuable historical records, which is a 27 percent increase over what was reported for FY
2005." Id. Despite previous extensions of the automatic declassification deadline, the
December 31, 20o6 deadline passed without further extension. It is expected that, because
of the extraordinary number of documents that are subject to automatic declassification, it
will take months for the documents to become available to the public and years for scholars
to sift through them. Scott Shane, Secrets to Be Declassified Under New Rule atAge 25,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2oo6, at A36.
62 Bush Order, supra note 40, § 1.7(a).
63 Id. at § 1.7(c).
64 Clinton Order, supra note 37, § 1.7(c).
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declassification of documents and creating more bases for the
classification of documents. 65
C. A CHANGE IN APPROACHES
While the Clinton Order fostered openness and public access to
documents, the Bush Order errs on the side of caution, favoring a
presumption of classification and non-disclosure. This change was
not only reflected in the differences between the respective Executive
Orders, but can also be found in memoranda by government officials
regarding FOIA and classification procedures.
It is important to note that the structure of FOIA does not require
an agency to claim exemptions. 66 Rather, FOIA grants agencies the
discretion to decide whether or not to invoke a FOIA exemption.67
Because of this discretion, disclosure policies can differ from agency to
agency and even within constituent sections of a single agency. In
addition, political events, such as a presidential election or a terrorist
attack, can have a substantial effect on an agency's discretion when
creating its disclosure policy.68 Since 1977, the Attorney General has
attempted to influence how agencies use this discretion by issuing a
memorandum that establishes standards for agencies to follow when
making disclosure decisions.69 The Attorney General's power over
agency discretion flows from the Department of Justice's almost
exclusive authority to represent the United States, its agencies, and its
officers in FOIA litigation.70 As a result, the Department of Justice is
ultimately charged with defending any agency decision to withhold
information.71
Since 1993, three executive branch memoranda have guided
agency disclosure decisions: the Reno Memorandum, issued pursuant
to the Clinton Order; the Ashcroft Memorandum and the Card
65 GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 79.
66 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
67 GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 291.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 291-92.
7lId. at 292.
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Memorandum, both issued pursuant to the Bush Order. Although
each memorandum offers different guidance to agencies, they all
illustrate with startling clarity that the executive branch is too
influential over the agency decision-making process. Because of this
influence and the unlikelihood that there will be a shift in the
executive branch's FOIA policies in the near future, any changes that
prevent the reclassification of information already available in the
public domain must be made within FOIA legislation itself.
1. THE RENO MEMORANDUM
In October 1993, President Clinton and Attorney General Janet
Reno took proactive steps to substantially increase the amount of
government information made available to the public.72 This marked
a dramatic change in the executive branch's usual approach to FOIA,
especially when compared to Clinton's predecessors, Ronald Reagan
and George H. W. Bush. In a memorandum to all departments and
agencies, Clinton recognized FOIA as a vital part of democracy and
expressed his intention to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Act
during his presidency.73 Clinton also seemed to express frustration at
previous agency practice in the handling of FOIA requests: "The use of
the Act by ordinary citizens is not complicated, nor should it be. The
existence of unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles has no place in its
implementation."74 In an effort to rid the system of some of these
bureaucratic hurdles, Clinton called upon agencies to "take a fresh
look at their administration of the Act, to reduce backlogs of Freedom
of Information Act requests, and to conform agency practice to the...
guidance issued by the Attorney General."75
One of the more dramatic changes made in the Reno
Memorandum was the rescission of the Department of Justice's 1981
72Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Government Adopts New Standard for Openness
(October 4,1993), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/reno.html.
73 Memorandum from President William J. Clinton, President, to Heads of Departments
and Agencies, The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia updates/VolXIV3/page2.htm [hereinafter Clinton
Memorandum] ("The Act is a vital part of the participatory system of government. I am
committed to enhancing its effectiveness in my Administration.").
74Id.
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guidelines for the defense of agency actions in FOIA litigation.76 -In
place of the 1981 guidelines, the Reno Memorandum stated: "The
Department will no longer defend an agency's withholding of
information merely because there is a 'substantial legal basis' for
doing so. Rather, in determining whether or not to defend a
nondisclosure decision, we will apply a presumption for disclosure."77
Thus:
It shall be the policy of the Department of Justice to defend
the assertion of a FOIA exemption only in those cases where
the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would be
harmful to an interest protected by that exemption. Where
an item of information might technically or arguably fall
within an exemption, it ought not to be withheld from a
FOIA requester unless it need be.78
The Reno Memorandum asserted that this change in policy would
accomplish the goal of maximum responsible disclosure of
government information, while preserving essential confidentiality.79
At the close of the memorandum, Attorney General Reno reiterated
that these new procedures would be implemented as a means of
"[making] government throughout the executive branch more open,
more responsive, and more accountable." 8°
Reno's inclusion of the "reasonably foreseeable" standard marked
the first time a presidential administration adopted such a disclosure-
friendly standard with regard to FOIA requests. One month after
September 11, however, Attorney General John Ashcroft retreated
from this policy and restored the earlier presumption in favor of
withholding information that had been abandoned following the Reno
Memorandum.
76 Reno Memorandum, supra note 7. Please note that while the author was writing this
comment, the direct link to the Reno Memorandum was removed from the Department of
Justice's Electronic Reading Room.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
8od.
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2. THE ASHCROFT AND CARD MEMORANDA
In October 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a
memorandum to all federal departments and agencies superseding the
Reno Memorandum.8' After citing the general policy behind FOIA,
the Ashcroft Memorandum acknowledged an equal commitment to
protecting "other fundamental values that are held by our society."82
Among these "other fundamental values," Ashcroft cited "the
safeguarding [of] our national security, enhancing the effectiveness of
our law enforcement agencies, protecting sensitive business
information, and, not least, preserving personal privacy."8 3 After
strong encouragement for every agency to fully and deliberately
consider the implications of information disclosure, Ashcroft
expressly repudiates Reno's promise to only defend those cases where
the agency "reasonably foresees" that disclosure would be harmful.8 4
Instead, the Ashcroft Memorandum promises agencies:
When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to
withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that
the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless
they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk
of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect
other important records.85
This Ashcroft Memorandum remains in effect, and no efforts have
been made to change the disclosure policies set forth by the Ashcroft
Memorandum.8 6
81 It is interesting to note that while the Ashcroft Memorandum specifically repudiates the
Reno Memorandum, the Clinton Memorandum, which was issued simultaneously with the
Reno Memorandum, presumably remains in effect. GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 29.
82 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 7.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales asserted in his Senate confirmation hearing that he
would "undertake an examination of the department's policies and practices concerning
FOIA disclosures," yet it is unclear whether such an examination was ever undertaken
during Gonzales's tenure. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R.
Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, lO9th Cong. 354 (2005) (responses of Alberto R. Gonzales, Nominee to be Att'y
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In March 2002, Chief of White House Staff Andrew Card, Jr. issued
his own memorandum. The Card Memorandum was specifically
focused on FOIA's Exemption 1, which sets standards for an agency to
follow when evaluating the decision to disclose documents pertaining
to weapons of mass destruction and other homeland security
matters. 87
Specifically, the Card Memorandum stated: "Government
information, regardless of its age, that could reasonably be expected to
assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction,
including information about the current locations of stockpiles of
nuclear materials that could be exploited for use in such weapons,
should not be disclosed inappropriately."88 Card then directed agency
officials to the attached guidance procedures issued by the
Information Security Oversight Office and the Office of Information
and Privacy at the Department of Justice. The guidance procedures
went on to lay out ways in which loopholes in FOIA should be
exploited to prevent automatic declassification. 89 These loopholes
Gen., to the written questions of Sen. Patrick Leahy). Prior to the Senate confirmation
hearings of Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, Senator Patrick Leahy sent Mukasey a
letter with the following inquiry:
Policies enacted by this [Bush] Administration have encouraged
Department of Justice officers to withhold information under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the bedrock statute that opens our
government to its citizens. Will you commit to review and consider
overturning these policies . . .so that the presumption of openness
which is at the heart of FOIA is restored for the American people?
Letter from Patrick J. Leahy, United States Senator, to Michael B. Mukasey, Nominee for
Attorney General (Oct. 2, 2007), at 3, available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/20071O/
1O-207%20PJL%2oquestions%20to%2oMukasey.pdf. Mukasey failed to answer the
inquiry in his response to Senator Leahy's letter. See Responses of Michael B. Mukasey,
Nominee for Attorney General, to Patrick J. Leahy, United States Senator (Oct. 9, 2007),
available at http://eahy.senate.gov/press/200710/Mukasey-questionnaire.pdf.
87 Card Memorandum, supra note 7.
88 Id.
89 Id. Specifically, the Memorandum addressed two loopholes. To take advantage of the
first loophole, the Memorandum directs agencies to classify weapons information that is
more than twenty-five years old even if it was not previously considered classified. For the
second loophole, the Memorandum advises agencies to reclassify sensitive information
concerning weapons of mass destruction even if the information was declassified if it had
never been disclosed under proper authority. See also Memorandum from Laura L. S.
Kimberly, Acting Director of Info. Sec. Oversight Office, and Richard L. Huff and Daniel J.
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existed in the automatic declassification procedures, the procedures
for disclosure of sensitive but unclassified information, and disclosure
procedures of previously unclassified or declassified information, all
found within the Bush Order.9O
While the post-September 1ith FOIA memoranda seem to create
an institutional preference for the withholding of information that
would have likely been disclosed under the Reno Memorandum's
"reasonably foreseeable" standard, it is unclear to what extent these
memoranda actually affect agency decisions.91 After the Ashcroft
Memorandum was issued, a 2003 study by the General Accountability
Office ("GAO") found that 48% of FOIA officers did not notice changes
in their agency's responses to FOIA requests compared to previous
years. Specifically, the officers noticed no change in the likelihood of
their agency making discretionary disclosures. However, about one-
third of FOIA officers did note a decreased likelihood of these
discretionary disclosures compared to previous years, with 75% of that
group attributing this new policy as a top factor influencing the
change.92 Thus, there is some basis for believing that the Ashcroft and
Card memoranda have caused a policy shift away from discretionary
disclosures.
3. A NEW KIND OF WAR
In December 2000, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, who was
then counsel to the President, wrote an article in the Washington Post
in which he said: "At times, certain documents may still be so sensitive
that they must remain confidential. In some cases, release of
documents could jeopardize our national security, and while the
Metcalfe, Co-Directors of the Office of Info. and Privacy, Dep't of Justice, to Departments
and Agencies, Safeguarding Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Other Sensitive Records Related to Homeland Security (Mar. 21, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2oo2foiapostio.htm [hereinafter DOJ
Memorandum]; HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, supra note 8, at 59; DADGE, supra note 6, at
149.
90 See Card Memorandum, supra note 7; DOJ Memorandum, supra note 89.
91 For instance, information that "arguably" falls within Exemption i is much less likely to
be disclosed under the Ashcroft and Card memoranda. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: AGENCY VIEWS ON CHANGES RESULTING FROM NEW
ADMINISTRATION POLICY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do3981.pdf.
92 Id.
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pursuit of history is invaluable to our society, it should not endanger
American lives."93 After September 11, 2001, it became clear that
America was engaged in a new kind of war, in which the enemy was
unknown, did not pledge allegiance to a particular country and
operated in our own backyard. Not only was the enemy sophisticated
and lethal, but America had drastically underestimated him.94
A few months after September 11, the Sun-Sentinel published an
editorial criticizing the government for "helping U.S. enemies" by
"freely sharing formerly classified information about how to turn
dangerous germs into lethal weapons."95 The editorial said, "It's too
late to reclassify the information. Once the genie is out of the bottle, it
can't be put back. But it doesn't have to be so easy to obtain, either."96
This emphasizes the crux of the debate: How much of the public's
right to know is America willing to sacrifice for national security?
Some, like the writer of the Sun-Sentinel editorial, believe national
security must be the government's paramount concern. In this new
kind of war, the possibility that publicly available information could
be used against America in a future terrorist attack is a risk that is too
great to take.
National security is of the utmost importance; this comment does
not advocate the disclosure of information that would be damaging to
national security. However, in the post-September ith era, there
have been marked examples of agencies withholding information that
does not appear to pose any such threat to national security.97 For
instance, the disclosure of cold war missile numbers that have been
available to the public for more than thirty years cannot rationally be
93 Alberto Gonzales, Editorial, Freedom, Openness and Presidential Papers, WASH. POST,
Dec. 20, 2001, at A43.
94 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT xvi
(2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION] ("We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated,
patient, disciplined, and lethal. The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim
world by demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward us and our
values is limitless .... We learned that institutions charged with protecting our borders,
civil aviation, and national security did not understand how grave this threat could be, and
did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices to deter or defeat it."), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/9i/report/9iReport.pdf.
95 Editorial, U.S. Must Stop Helping Enemies, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2002, at A16.
96 Id.
97 See infra notes 107-o8.
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considered a threat to national security, especially when the numbers
are easily accessible on the Internet.98
One of the conceptual underpinnings of FOIA is the need to
encourage an open and honest government. 99 When the Executive
impedes access to documents the public is entitled to view, especially
documents that have existed within the public domain for long
periods of time, it is difficult to see how national security is being
served. The information cannot be construed "secret" any longer
because the information is already out there and has been for a long
time. °° When information is erroneously released to the public, an
agency should be able to retrieve that information up to a certain
point. However, there needs to be a limit on this power of retrieval.
Whether the reclassifications are the result of sinister or cautious
motives is irrelevant. Strict restrictions are still needed to ensure that
agencies are making the proper decisions when deciding whether to
disclose requested information. Leaving agencies virtually
unrestricted in their reclassification decision makes the temptation to
restrict data for improper purposes too great.10 1
III. IMPOSING STRICT RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
TO RECLASSIFY DOCUMENTS ALREADY RELEASED
IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
While agencies have broad discretion in their disclosure decisions,
guided of course by the Attorney General's standards, one area where
98 See Burr, supra note 4 (comparing cold war documents released in the 197os with their
identical counterparts released this year to reflect the change in agency disclosures), but
see U.S. Must Stop Helping Enemies, supra note 95; Broad, supra note 9 (quoting
Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, who said that critics of the removal of information
from the public domain were overreacting and that "we have to remember what we're up
against.").
99 David 0. Stewart, On 4oth Birthday, Freedom of Information Act Faces Midlife Crisis,
BALT. SUN, July 4,2006, at Ag.
1o Students Against Genocide v. Dep't of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
10, After the Archive issued its initial report about the Cold War missile blackout, the
Department of Defense released, as a result of an administrative appeal, unredacted
versions of documents that had initially been subject to the blackout. "Reclassification of
previously public data crossed the line into absurdity, and now our protests have
established a whole new feature of the secrecy system: de-re-classification!" said Archive
director Thomas Blanton. Administrative appeals on other documents are still pending.
Burr, supra note 4.
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agencies should not have such discretion is in the reclassification of
information already released in the public domain. Leaving such
decisions to agencies with little guidance will often result in erroneous
withholdings, with little or no benefit to national security, while
creating an immense burden on the public's right to know.
Although the Bush Order sets out reclassification procedures, the
substantial increase in post-9/11 reclassifications of information
already in the public domain, virtually all of which have occurred
without agency observance of the Bush Order procedures, evinces the
reality that the current system is flawed.102 Upon review, the judiciary
has refused to allow the withholding of information already in the
public domain, formulating its own standard for restricting these
reclassifications.103 However, in practice, individuals making FOIA
requests have rarely been able to satisfy the too stringent standard
established by the judiciary.
The inadequacy of current procedures and the dramatic effects on
the public as a result of these erroneous reclassifications signify that it
is time to place strict restrictions on the executive's authority to
reclassify documents already released in the public domain.104 As the
Ashcroft and Card memoranda show, the executive branch too easily
influences agency discretion.O5 Thus, these changes must be made
within FOIA legislation itself, not in the Executive Order governing
agency use of Exemption 1.
A. THE BUSH EXECUTIVE ORDER CONTAINS INADEQUATE
RECLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
The removal of information from the public domain has been
rampant since September 1ith. Claiming national security as a basis
for their actions, numerous agencies began removing information
from their websites shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World
102 INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, AUDIT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF RECORDS FROM PUBLIC
ACCESS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION FOR CLASSIFICATION
PURPOSES 5(2OO6), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2oo6-audit-
report.pdf [hereinafter ISOO AUDIT].
103 See infra Part III.B.
104 For a discussion on the impacts of erroneous reclassification on the public, see infra
Part III.C.2.
105 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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Trade Center.1°6 According to one report, federal agencies have
removed more than 25,000 previously disclosed records from the
National Archives and reclassified them as "secret."107 Some of these
documents included a 1951 assessment of agrarian reform in
Guatemala and a 1948 memo about leaflet droppings in Communist
countries.1o 8 In January 2002, the Bush Administration began
withdrawing more than 6,6oo technical documents, mainly
concerning the production of germ and chemical weapons, from the
public sphere, and there have been other numerous reports that
agencies no longer disclose certain types of information.o9 While
some of these protective measures were legitimate, there have been
claims by journalists, private organizations, businesses, and other
concerned individuals that some of these documents should not have
been reclassified and removed from the public domain.w °o
Prior to the Bush Order, under no circumstances could an agency
reclassify documents that had been declassified and released to the
public.- But, the Bush Order removed this blanket prohibition,
allowing for reclassification if the particular information could be
"reasonably recovered" and if the agency observed certain procedures
prior to reclassifying the information.112
Although the Bush Order forbids reclassification where the
documents cannot be "reasonably recovered," this restriction is
insufficient. Specifically, the restriction leaves the classifying
authority with too much discretion to determine what can and cannot
"reasonably" be recovered. Despite assertions by government officials
that these are adequate limitations on reclassification, the subjectivity
106 0MB Watch, supra note 8; Mart, supra note 9, at 15 (citing examples where the
Environmental Protection Agency and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission improperly
used terrorism as an excuse to remove information regarding risk management plans,
dams, pipelines, and other energy facilities from the public's reach). The EPA later
conceded the disclosure of this information posed no unique, increased threat to national
security. Mart, supra note 9, at 15.
107 Stewart, supra note 99.
1o Id.
109 Broad, supra note 9. See generally Mart, supra note 9.
110 Broad, supra note 9; Mart, supra note 9, at 7-8; Lee, supra note 3; Pitts, supra note io.
1 Clinton Order, supra note 37.
112 Bush Order, supra note 40, § 1.7(c). See supra text accompanying note 64.
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leads to the ultimate failure of the overall reclassification scheme set
forth in Section 1.7(b).113
The scheme's ultimate failure is demonstrated in a 20o6
Information Security Oversight Office ("ISOO") audit of the
withdrawal of records from public access for classification purposes. 14
The audit surveyed 1,353 documents that had been withdrawn from
public access, and found that of these documents, 46% were not
entitled to continued classification-the removal was erroneous. 15 The
ISOO indicated that, in many cases, even when the withdrawn record
met the standard of continued classification, the ISOO believed that
"insufficient judgment was applied to the decision to withdraw the
record from public access."116  This was especially true where
withdrawal was virtually ineffective because the record had been
published elsewhere.117 The ISOO also noted in its report that since
the reclassification exception was adopted in the Bush Order, not one
agency had notified the ISOO of any reclassification action (pursuant
to the third requirement for reclassification).B Such findings make
one question whether an agency ever actually considers these
reclassification requirements when it is faced with a FOIA request.
The answer to this question becomes even clearer upon analysis of
the Archive's Cold War missile report. When making disclosure
decisions, an agency is required to indicate the reason for determining
that information cannot be disclosed. For instance, in the case of the
redacted Cold War missile numbers, the agency often cited to Section
113 Too Many Secrets, supra note 23.
'14 ISO0 AUDIT, supra note 102. The ISO0 is responsible to the president for policy and
oversight of the Government-wide security classification system and the National
Industrial Security Program. See National Archives, Information Security Oversight Office
Home Page, Information Security Oversight Office, http://www.archives.gov/isoo/ (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008).
115 ISOO AUDIT, supra note 102, at 1. For the audit, ISOO used the standards for
classification set forth in the Bush Order, as well as agency declassification guides, to
assign each sampled record to one of three categories: "appropriate," "questionable," or
"inappropriate." A record was considered "inappropriate" if"it was clear that none of the
information in the record met the standards for continued classification or if the record
was reclassified without following proper procedures." Id. at 14-15.
n16 Id. at 2.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 5.
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3.3 of the Bush Order as its basis for withholding information.119
However, Section 3.3 governs the automatic declassification of records
more than twenty-five years old that have not already been
declassified. The documents and the information redacted from the
Cold War missile documents were declassified years ago.120 In
addition, many of the exemptions were claimed under Section
3.3(b)(5), which allows an agency head to exempt from automatic
declassification information that could be expected to reveal actual
U.S. military war plans that remain in effect.121 One example of this
claimed exemption is in the 2006 release of a memorandum from
former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President John F.
Kennedy, in which the disclosing agency redacted numbers of
strategic missiles contained in U.S. nuclear arsenals between 1965 and
1967.122 It is difficult to see how these numbers could reasonably be
expected to reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect,
especially when such numbers are outdated and continue to be easily
accessible on the Internet.23
It is impossible to know for sure whether erroneous
reclassifications such as these are the result of agencies failing to
adhere to the reclassification procedures set forth in Section 1.7(b) of
the Bush Order or simply the result of agencies failing to consider the
procedures at all. It is difficult to see how agencies could possibly be
considering these requirements when there are numerous instances of
information being erroneously reclassified, but not one instance of an
agency going through the Section 1.7(b) reclassification procedures.24
Regardless of whether agencies actually consider the reclassification
119 See generally Burr, supra note 4 (showing numerous examples of the agency citing
Section 3.3 of the Bush Executive Order as its basis for redacting information that was
previously available).
120 Id.
121 Bush Order, supra note 40, § 3.3(b)(5).
122 See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, to the
President, Recommended FY 1966-197o Programs for Strategic Offensive Forces,
Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces, and Civil Defense 7 (Dec. 3, 1964), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB19 7 /nd%2o1b.pdf (showing redactions
and corresponding exemptions).
123 See, e.g., id. at 5 (showing numbers of nuclear weapons in United States arsenal
between 1965 and 1967).
124 See supra notes 114-16.
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procedure when they are presented with a FOIA request, the fact
remains that there are still too many instances of erroneous
reclassifications under the guidance of the Bush Order.
B. CASE LAW APPROACH TO CLAIMS OF RECLASSIFICATION
When reviewing an agency's decision to deny a FOIA request,
courts are required to conduct review de novo.125 De novo review
requires that the court conduct non-deferential review of agency
action, and that the agency bear the burden of justifying its decision to
deny the request.126 Thus, the reviewing court makes the ultimate
determination whether information should be withheld under any of
the nine exemptions.27 However, when courts conduct review of non-
disclosure based on Exemption 1, courts have consistently deferred to
the agency's determination.2 8 Such deference to agency decisions on
national security has even been endorsed by Congress.29
Despite the substantial deference afforded to agencies on national
security matters,1 30 even courts have shown a willingness to accept the
argument that publicly known information cannot be withheld under
1255 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
126 d.
127 Id.
128 Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696(2001) (stating that "terrorism or other
special circumstances" might warrant "heightened deference to the judgments of the
political branches"); Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("[C]ourts
traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the executive in military
and national security affairs."); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding that courts are to "accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning
the details of the classified status of the disputed record" because "the Executive
departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique
insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified
record").
129 S. Rep. No. 93-120o, at 8-9, 12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
130 For a more general discussion of de novo review and judicial deference, see Nathan
Slegers, Comment, De Novo Review Under the Freedom of Information Act: The Case
Against Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions to Withhold Information, 43 SAN DIEGO L
REv. 209(2006).
IVol 4:2
F1TZSIMMONS
Exemption 1.131 For information to be "officially acknowledged" such
that the agency has waived its right to invoke Exemption 1, courts
require that information sought must: (i) be as "specific" as the
information previously disclosed; (2) "match" the information
previously disclosed; and (3) have been made public through an
"official and documented" disclosure.132 The burden of proof rests on
the individual making FOIA request. However, the courts that have
applied this test recognize that the individual initiating the request
faces "substantial practical difficulties in using [FOIA] to force the
government to release further information" when attempting to
establish the.elements of the claim.133
First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to show with specificity that
the documents are the same. If such a precise showing could be made,
it is unlikely the requester would have placed the request in the first
place.134 Second, courts will often not allow the disclosure of
information that is subject to widespread media and public
speculation on grounds that official acknowledgement by an
authoritative source may still cause damage to national security.135
For example, in Afshar v. Department of State, information published
in books by former CIA agents and officials, all of which had been
subject to prepublication review by the CIA, was not enough to garner
the release of the documents because the information in the books was
not specifically revealed by the CIA.136 Third, courts are sensitive to
the difficulty of distinguishing with particularity, without revealing
information that ought to be kept secret, releasable documents from
131 Afshar v. Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Founding Church of
Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 61o F.2d 824, 831-32 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Lamont v. Dep't of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Military Audit
Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 741-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554
(D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Under the public-domain doctrine, materials normally immunized from
disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a
permanent public record.").
132 Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 199o); Davis v. Dep't of Justice, 968 F.2d
1276, 128o (D.C. Cir. 1992); Students Against Genocide v. Dep't of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
133 Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130.
134 See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764
(1989); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
135Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130-31.
136 Id. at 1133.
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those that must be withheld.137 Thus, if the court sees no bad faith or
sloppiness in the declassification or review process, "a court will feel
with special urgency the need to 'accord substantial weight to an
agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the
disputed record."138
While the application of the Public Domain Doctrine usually
results in a court upholding an agency's non-disclosure, there have
been a few instances where disclosure was compelled or the court
implied that different facts might compel disclosure. In Cottone v.
Reno, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that,
until destroyed or placed under seal, tapes played in open court and
admitted into evidence, the court reporter's transcript, the parties'
briefs, and the judge's orders and opinions remain part of the public
domain.139 However, the court stipulated that Cottone was only
entitled to those audio tapes played in court, and that any
constitutionally compelled disclosure to a single party is not
considered to be in the public domain.14° In addition, the D.C. Circuit
in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Department of Energy held that
initiators of FOIA requests may be able to satisfy their burden of
production by pointing to a regulation that requires disclosure of the
specific information sought.141
Despite these rare cases of a successful challenge to nondisclosure,
the often insurmountable hurdles created by the Public Domain
Doctrine almost always result in an agency victory. Courts are
extremely hesitant to override agency determinations on national
security matters. Although the courts are willing to recognize that the
exemption cannot be claimed when the information is already in the
public domain, they have failed to formulate an adequate test.
137 Id. at 1131.
138 Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 93-12oo, at 12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)).
139 Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554-55 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But see Doolittle v. Dep't of
Justice, 142 F. Supp. 2d 281,285 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
140 Cottone, 193 F.3d at 556.
141 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(allowing a regulation requiring publication of information to meet the burden of
production but holding that the burden was not fulfilled because the information required
by the regulatory form was projected data while the document requested contained actual
data).
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C. POLICY REASONS FOR IMPOSING STRICT STANDARDS
While it is clear that agencies are frequently removing documents
from the public sphere, they encounter little or no interference from
Congress or the courts. Nevertheless, the removal of information
from the public domain has consequences that reach far beyond the
initial FOIA requester. Allowing these agency decisions to go largely
unchecked not only undermines the spirit of FOIA, but also fosters the
public's distrust of government while securing little or no aid to
national security.
1. LOCKING THE BARN AFTER THE HORSE HAS ESCAPED
In a Baltimore Sun editorial, columnist Leonard Pitts Jr. stated
that the Cold War missile blackout was "a classic case of locking the
barn after the horse has escaped-and died of old age."42 Once an
agency discloses information to the National Archives, FOIA
requesters, libraries, or the public through the Internet, the ability for
that agency to "reasonably" reclaim that information is virtually
impossible, especially because of replication on the Internet.1 43 Once
something is released, it can and usually is easily replicated on the
Internet. For instance, in the case of the Cold War missile blackout,
the Archive provides PDF versions of all original documents where the
information was not blacked out.144 To view these documents, one
must only download the free viewing software and click on the
hyperlink.
Even courts recognize the absurdity of trying to reclaim
information in the public domain. As one court points out: "If the
information has already been disclosed and is so widely disseminated
that it cannot be made secret again, its subsequent disclosure will
cause no further damage to the national security."145 Furthermore, the
suppression of such information would "frustrate the pressing policies
of the Act without even arguably advancing countervailing
considerations." 146 When courts are faced with deciding whether to
142 Pitts, supra note lo.
143 See generally Mart, supra note 9.
44 See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. See generally Burr, supra note 4.
145 Wash. Post v. Dep't of Defense, 766 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1991).
146 Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 61o F.2d 824,
831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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override agency determinations and release information, however,
they are hesitant because they "lack the authority to limit the
dissemination of documents once they are released under FOIA, or to
choose selectively among recipients."'47 Because agencies cannot
"reasonably" reclaim information already in the public domain, strict
restrictions need to be placed on agencies' attempts to do so.
2. RECLASSIFICATION DEPRIVES SOCIETY OF BENEFICIAL
USES OF RECLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
While it may seem that the reclassification of documents, such as
those disclosing Cold War missile numbers, may have little impact on
society, the effects of such reclassifications have broad implications.
Disclosure of such information and other information that is
subsequently reclassified has many societal benefits that are
endangered by this penchant for secrecy.
After September 11th, both the Bush Administration and federal
agencies erred on the side of caution rather than risk disclosure of
information that could pose harm to the nation's security.148 The fact
remains, however, that disclosure is the sole means by which an
agency can promote public awareness. Critics of agency non-
disclosure have argued that it was the secrecy of agencies like the
Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation that
led to the events of September 11, 2001.149 It was argued that had
agencies been more open about what they knew, the public's input
could have helped the agencies connect the dots, revealing al Qaeda's
plan for the September 11th attacks. These arguments gained
acceptance when the 9/11 Commission concluded that only "publicity"
could have "derailed the attacks."5o
Such assertions by the Commission seem at odds with increasing
instances of agencies reclaiming documents from the public sphere.
Although the disclosure of Cold War missile numbers is unlikely to
have much impact on public awareness, the likelihood is high that
147 Students Against Genocide v. Dep't of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
148 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Spymasters Accountable After 9/11: A
Proposed Modelfor CIA Disclosure Requirements Under the Freedom of Information Act,
27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 79,84-85 (2004).
150 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 247, 276, 541 n.107.
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other information that would impact public awareness might be or
already has been removed from the public purview. Such agency
practices only hurt rather than help the fight against terrorism. By
attempting to reclaim information from the public domain, agencies
will only succeed in impeding public access to important information
that could ultimately help thwart a future terrorist attack.
Disclosure not only promotes public awareness, it allows
journalists and independent organizations the ability to investigate
the activities of government departments and agencies.151 However,
the executive branch's affinity for secrecy makes it increasingly
difficult for journalists and other organizations to do their jobs. Al
Cross of the Society of Professional Journalists once stated that
because of such secrecy, journalists have found it "increasingly
difficult to fulfill their role as watchdogs."152 While agency attempts to
remove information from the public domain are unlikely to ultimately
succeed, they do impede deadline-oriented journalists by making the
hunt for information more difficult and time-consuming.
Although FOIA has widely become associated with the media,
research shows that the media are the least likely to file a FOIA
request when they want information.53 According to reporters, it
simply takes too long to get information through FOIA when they are
working on deadlines.,54 Instead, as one study suggests, FOIA has
become a critical tool for businesses seeking government information
and companies conducting competitive research.55 A recent study of
more than 6,400 FOIA requests conducted by the Coalition of
Journalists for Open Government showed that businesses made about
two-thirds of FOIA requests to 2o departments and agencies.156 One-
151 STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 20; DADGE, supra note 6, at 148.
152 FreedomForum.org, Panelists Tell Editors: Congressional Efforts to Protect Freedom
May Thwart it (Oct. 15, 2001),
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=15152.
153 Coalition of Journalists for Open Government, Frequent Filers: Businesses Make FOIA
their Business (July 3, 2006), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
FrequentFilers FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Frequent Filers] (finding that media requests
accounted for just six percent of the total requested documents in its study).
154 Id. ("Many reporters say it takes too long to get information through FOIA to make it a
meaningful tool for newsgathering. It is used more frequently by journalists working on
longer, investigative projects.").
155 Id.; STEINBERG, supra note 6, at 20.
156 Frequent Filers, supra note 153.
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fourth of those requests were placed by professional data brokers who
sought information for clients ranging from information on asbestos
levels on old Navy ships to cockpit recordings from airplane crashes to
background data on prospective employees.157
The ability to access such documents not only fosters
competitiveness in business, it allows a business to obtain information
to assist the business in complying with the law, to help it respond to
an inquiry or investigation, and to aid in efforts to shape policies and
influence agency decisions.158 Further, it allows a business to obtain
information compiled by the government that may be valuable and
marketable by the requester.15 9 Fostering competitiveness, developing
new technology, and assisting law-abiding businesses are all benefits
of disclosure. By limiting access to this information through the
reclassification of documents already in the public domain, there is no
question that business use of FOIA will be greatly impacted.
Documents will no longer be readily accessible, making it increasingly
difficult for companies to conduct one of the basic steps in their
research. Furthermore, without access to this information, it is likely
that the cost of doing business will increase as businesses will be
required to operate under the risk created by the lack of information
transparency.
In addition, withdrawal of information from the public sphere can
have a drastic effect on scientific and medical research.160 In January
2002, when the Bush Administration began removing more than
6,6oo technical documents from the public sphere, many scientists
feared that such practices would erode the foundations of American
science.161 The documents removed mainly dealt with the production
of germ and chemical weapons and were found not only in reports
from the 1940s to the 196os that had been declassified and freely
available to the public before their removal, but also more modem
reports that had previously been judged to contain no secret
material. 62 Some scientists expressed fears that government officials
157 Id.
158 Susman & Hammitt, supra note 18, at A-8 to -1o.
159 Id.
i6o DADGE, supra note 6, at 15o; Broad, supra note 9.
16, Broad, supra note 9.
162I d.
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eager to remove these documents from the public domain would
overlook how these types of documents on dangerous substances
could produce cures, disease antidotes and surprise discoveries. As
then president of the Federation of American Societies for
Experimental Biology Robert R. Rich said: "It comes down to a risk-
benefit ratio. I think the risk of forgone advances is much greater than
the information getting into the wrong hands."163
While the availability of such documents could cause information
to potentially fall into the wrong hands, removing the documents from
the public domain is impossible when they have been available for too
long. Rather than deterring the determined terrorist, the removal of
these documents from the public domain is more likely to inhibit
scientific and medical research. The resolute terrorist who knows
what he or she is looking for will be able to find the information,
regardless of the government's attempts to remove the documents
from the public domain. But the scientist or doctor who browses the
public domain looking for that missing link in his or her research will
likely never find it because it is no longer readily available for viewing.
Finally, the release of documents, particularly those more than
twenty-five years old, strongly impacts how the public views the
nation historically. The Clinton mandate for automatic
declassification of documents older than twenty-five years was
monumental. For the first time, the executive branch wanted to
clarify the historical record with the release of documents that would
paint the true picture of the nation's history. 164 The release of these
sorts of documents does not impede national security; rather, it helps
historians develop a more accurate picture of some of the nation's
most important events. Suddenly removing these documents from the
public domain inhibits historical curiosity and obstructs efforts to
correct the historical record, while providing little benefit to national
security interests.
3. JUDICIAL ECONOMY
In addition to the difficulty in fully removing information already
disclosed from the public domain, and the negative impacts on society
of removing such information, the effects of this reclassification
practice will eventually be felt by the judiciary as well.
163d.
164 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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In litigation, FOIA requests are often used as an adjunct to civil
and criminal discovery.165 In the civil context, a potential plaintiff can
obtain information through FOIA requests to evaluate his or her case,
and; a defendant can obtain relevant documents through FOIA
without having to wait until formal discovery commences.166 In
addition, where discovery is limited in scope, FOIA may provide the
only avenue for obtaining important information. 167 In the criminal
context, FOIA can be used for a variety of purposes, which include:
obtaining information used by prosecutors, obtaining documents
underlying the criminal charges, and documents that explain the basis
for the criminal charges.168 FOIA can also serve as a critical tool in a
criminal case when discovery is much more restricted.169 By
restricting access to information through reclassification, FOIA begins
to lose its effectiveness as a tool in litigation.170
Further, the act of reclassification itself is likely to result in
litigation. If someone files a FOIA request and information is
improperly withheld, he or she has a statutory right to compel
disclosure.171 It is no secret that it usually takes a significant amount
of time to reach a resolution where FOIA is concerned. Due to agency
backlogs and other logistical issues, FOIA litigation typically takes
months, if not years, to reach a resolution.172 Unnecessary
reclassification of information already in the public domain not only
wastes the litigant's resources, but also causes even more agency
backlog and wastes the court's time and energy. If stricter standards
for reclassifying documents in the public domain existed, agencies
165 See Susman & Hammitt, supra note 18, at A-9; GIDIERE, supra note 18, at 331-34.
166 Susman & Hammitt, supra note 18, at A-9.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
17o For more information on how courts have handled the use of FOLA as an adjunct to
discovery, see George K. Chamberlin, Annotation, Use of Freedom of Information Act (5
U.S.C.A. § 552) as Substitute for, or as Means of, Supplementing Discovery Procedures
Available to Litigants in Federal Civil, Criminal, or Administrative Proceedings, 57 A.L.R.
Fed. 903 (1982).
1715 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2oo6).
172 Susman & Hammitt, supra note 18, at A-39 to -40.
[Vol 4:2
FITISMMONS
would not engage in this practice as much, and challenges would more
than likely be resolved before they reached the courts.
IV. POSSIBLE WAYS TO RESTRICT EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO
RECLASSIFY DOCUMENTS ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The problem of improper reclassification is caused by a
combination of factors: inadequate safeguards against such
reclassifications within the governing Executive Order, insufficient
oversight of agency reclassification decisions, and consistent, yet
misplaced, judicial deference to Exemption 1 decisions. While it is
easy to articulate the problem, it is more difficult to offer a proper
solution. The best solution will be one that successfully balances the
government's need to protect national security and the public's need
to know. Although it is unlikely that such a perfect balance will ever
be achieved, there are changes that could be made to the system to
prevent erroneous reclassifications of information that is already in
the public domain.
A. CHANGES WITHIN THE CURRENT SYSTEM
William Leonard, the head of Information Security Oversight
Office, asserts that the faults with the reclassification system are not
the product of unnecessary secrecy; rather, he claims that they are the
result of inadequate training.173 Further, Leonard states that incorrect
classification decisions are the result of the "lack of proactive
oversight within agencies or a lack of effective training and awareness
provided to some cleared personnel."74 Given the executive branch's
movement towards secrecy, it is difficult to believe that these removals
are simply the product of inadequate training. Granted, with more
effective training, it is likely that there will be fewer instances of truly
erroneous reclassifications. But such training is still unlikely to cure
the inadequacies of the reclassification procedures set forth in the
Bush Order. Within the Bush procedures, the burden to change this
agency practice will fall on the executive branch and the agencies
themselves. For example, every agency could begin by establishing a
database that is capable of tracking all agency declassifications and
the locations where the declassified documents have been published.
-73 Too Many Secrets, supra note 23.
174 Id.
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Then, the agency could formulate regulations that limit the amount of
time the agency has to reclassify information already available in the
public domain. Once the time limit expires, it is unlikely that the
information can reasonably be recovered, and thus, the agency should
be barred from reclassifying the information.
Further, the agency should research before simply taking
information out of the public domain. In August 2oo6, the D.C.
Circuit was presented with a case where the FBI refused to disclose
audio tapes of a conversation between two men that was more than
twenty-five years old.175 The FBI claimed that for privacy reasons, it
could not disclose the tapes unless both men participating in the
conversation were deceased, and that it was unable to ascertain
whether the men were dead or alive.176 In the opinion, D.C. Circuit
Judge Merrick B. Garland chastised the FBI for not "Googling" the
names of the two men. Garland asks the rhetorical question: "Why, in
short, doesn't the FBI just Google the two names? Surely, in the
Internet age, a 'reasonable alternative' for finding out whether a
prominent person is dead is to use Google (or any other search
engine) to find a report of that person's death."177
While this was not a case dealing with a reclassification decision,
the same reasoning from Judge Garland's opinion should apply to
cases of reclassification. It takes little if any time to conduct a
preliminary search to see how much the questioned document has
infiltrated the Internet. If the document is easily accessible, then the
document should not be removed.
B. CASE LAW STANDARD
Although the judiciary recognizes the problem of reclassifying
documents that are already available in the public domain, the
standard developed by the courts to deal with the problem has proven
to be unworkable.178 Working within the court's current framework, a
number of changes could be made to facilitate the disclosure of
erroneously reclassified information.
175 Davis v. Dep't of Justice, 460 F.3d 92, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reviewing District Court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of FBI, which had previously denied plaintiffs FOIA
request for numerous audio tapes on privacy grounds).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 102.
178 See supra Part III.B.
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First, the court should not limit the rule to only those documents
that have been "officially disclosed" by the agency. While the
requester should have to show that the document was in the public
domain at one time, subsequent reproductions of the document by
other sources should be enough to require the agency to honor FOIA
request.
Second, instead of placing the burden on the requester, the agency
should have the burden of proof to show that the information cannot
be readily accessed on the Internet. Because the agency knows what
information the document contains, it is in the best position to search
its own records for information regarding previous disclosures. It is
also in the best position to conduct a comprehensive search of the
Internet for reproductions.
Finally, the initiator of a FOIA request should not be held to the
most stringent prongs of the test: those requiring that the information
be as "specific" and "match" the information previously disclosed.
The initiator should have to provide information that is specific
enough to show that the document was available at one time. For
instance, a FOIA requester should articulate the location of the
information, the date the information was accessed, and a general
description of the information itself. If a FOIA requester can provide
such information, and the agency still refuses to disclose the
documents, the judicial branch should engage in in-camera review as
permitted by the FOIA.179
While it is unlikely that these changes will lead to the disclosure of
erroneously reclassified documents, it will likely increase a requester's
chance of prevailing on a reclassification claim in court. Rather than
trying to restructure the current framework to achieve minimal
success, the court should implement a formula that more properly
addresses the countervailing interests and engages the court in more
rigorous review.
When formulating this more rigorous review standard, the
judiciary's handling of an analogous situation is instructive. Rule
26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives federal district
judges broad discretion to design protective orders, upon a showing of
good cause" and as "justice requires" to protect "a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
1795 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) ("On complaint. ... the court... may examine the
contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part
thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this
section ....").
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expense."18o Although the majority of requests for protective orders
arise during the discovery stage, there are occasions when such
requests are made after the materials at issue have been received into
evidence in open court1S These post-evidentiary requests have
required the judiciary to formulate a standard that balances the
public's right of access, which was recognized in the criminal context
by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications, and the
interests of the party requesting the protective order.82
Unable to reach a consensus, the circuit courts that have
addressed this issue take one of three approaches, all of which differ in
the weight given to the public's right of access.18 s Many circuit courts,
specifically the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits, adopt the view that the presumption in favor of the right of
public access is all but conclusive on the issue of possible protective
orders, such that a protective order for material already entered into
evidence in open court may be obtained only under "extraordinary
circumstances" or where there is a "compelling reason" for such
protection.184 The second approach, followed by the Third, Seventh,
18o FED. R. CIV. P. 26(C).
18, Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Propriety and Scope of Protective Order against
Disclosure of MaterialAlready Entered into Evidence in Federal Court Trial, 138 A.L.R.
FED. 153, § 2a (1997).
182 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589,597-98 (1978) ("[Clourts of this country
recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents.... The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ
compelling access has been found, for example, in the citizen's desire to keep a watchful
eye on the workings of public agencies.... [But] the right to inspect and copy judicial
records is not absolute."). Although Nixon recognized the public's right of access, there is
authority applying such logic to the civil context. See Donaldson, supra note 181, § 3.
183 Donaldson, supra note 181, § 2a.
184 Poliquin v. Garden Way, 989 F.2d 527,533 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[O]nly the most compelling
showing can justify post-trial restriction on disclosure of testimony or documents actually
introduced at trial."); United States v. Myers (In re Application of NBC), 635 F.2d 945, 952
(2d Cir. 198o) ("[I]t would take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions
on the opportunity of those not physically in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear
the evidence."); In re Assoc'd Press, 172 F. App'x 1, 5 (4th Cir. 20o6) (adhering to
"extraordinary circumstances" test); United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 414 (6th Cir.
1986) ("When a deprivation of access to information occurs due to an exclusion from
judicial records, the constitutional right to know is implicated, and it is then appropriate
that this court undertake a stringent review of the lower court's decision.... Under such
circumstances, where the public is barred from learning the facts of a dispute, 'only the
most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.'" (quoting In re
Knoxville News-Sentinel, Co. Inc., 723 F.2d 470,476 (6th Cir. 1983))); Wilson v. Am.
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Ninth, and D.C. Circuits, endorses the view that while the
presumption in favor of public access is "strong," it may be less than
decisive.,85 The third and final approach, adopted by the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits, views the presumption of access as one of many
factors to be weighed by the trial court. 8 6
The circuit courts adopting the "all-but-conclusive" standard do so
upon recognition that the public's right of access is essential for the
public to have confidence "that justice is being done by its courts in all
matters."18 7 Accordingly, courts rigorously guard the presumption in
favor of this right of access when a protective order is sought. 188 Yet,
when a strikingly similar interest is at issue in the FOIA context-
ensuring that government is acting honestly and in the best interests
of its people-courts adopt a presumption against the right of access
and place almost insurmountable hurdles before those seeking
Motor Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[W]here, as in the present case, the
[court] attempts to deny access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it
must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to that interest." (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982))). While there is no clear formula for determining what
constitutes "extraordinary circumstances" or a "compelling reason," the courts have
provided some guidance. See Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 533 ("[Without more], commercial
embarrassment is not a 'compelling reason' to seal a trial record."); In re Knoxville News-
Sentinel 723 F.2d at 478 ("'[Plrivacy rights of participants and third parties' are among
those interests which, in appropriate cases, can limit the presumptive right of access to
judicial records." (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FrC, 71o F.2d 1165, 1179
(6th Cir. 1983))).
18s United States v. Criden (In re Application of NBC), 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981)
("ITihere is a strong presumption that material introduced into evidence at trial should be
made reasonably accessible in a manner suitable for copying and broader dissemination.");
United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[Tlhere is a strong
presumption in support of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records.");
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. Dist. Court for Dist. of Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986)
("IT]here is a strong presumption in support of the common law right to inspect and copy
judicial records."); United States v. Hubbard, 65o F.2d 293, 317 (D.C. Cir. 198o) ("strong
presumption in favor of public access").
186 Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
presumption in favor of public access to judicial records is one of the interests to be
weighed, and the simple existence of the right is not conclusive); United States v. Webbe,
791 F.2d 103, 1o6 (8th Cir. 1986) (declining to adopt the "strong presumption" view and
adopting Fifth Circuit view that presumption of access is one of many factors).
1s7 Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 533.
188 See supra note 184.
2008]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
disclosure of documents that have been reclassified.18 9 Since
proponents of these protective orders are subject to such a strict
standard for the purpose of ensuring that the public knows justice is
being served in the courts, so too should a federal agency seeking to
reclassify public information be subject to a similar strict standard to
ensure that the public knows justice is being served by the federal
government. Rather than adopting the current counter-intuitive
standard, courts should apply a similar "all-but-conclusive" standard
when they deal with requests for reclassified information. If national
security is truly at issue and would be jeopardized by the re-release of
the information, it will be entitled to protection as an "extraordinary
circumstance" or "compelling reason."
In addition, such a presumption in favor of the right of access
would require agencies to show that the information has not been
previously disclosed, thereby placing the burden on the party best
equipped to meet the burden. This approach strikes a better balance
than the current approach. Not only would the presumption in favor
of the right of access result in the dissemination of documents that
rightly belong in the public domain; it would also still protect
information that truly endangers national security.
Although the "all-but-conclusive" standard seems to achieve the
best balance of interests, even the "strong presumption" approach
would pose a better solution than the approach currently utilized by
courts. The "strong presumption" approach recognizes the "strong"
presumption in favor of the right of access, but also takes into account
other factors that should garner the court's consideration.190 The
factors relevant to this discussion include: (1) the degree of legitimate
public interest in the information'9; (2) potential for risk to national
or other governmental security92; (3) prior access to materials93; and
189 See supra Part III.B.
19o See supra note 185.
191 See, e.g., United States v. Criden (In re Application of NBC), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir.
1981) (reasoning that where "the actions of the indicted elected officials, the conduct of the
law enforcement agencies, and the court's decision to set aside the convictions combine to
create legitimate public interest in the proceedings far beyond the usual criminal case"
dissemination is highly favored); United States v. Myers (In re Application of NBC), 635
F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 198o) ("The presumption [in favor of public access] is especially
strong in a case like this where the evidence shows the actions of public officials, both the
defendants and law enforcement personnel.").
192 Although research does not yield any case in which a court has issued a protective order
to prevent potential harm to national or other governmental security, some courts have
hinted that a court may consider the potential harm as a factor in its determination. See,
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(4) inadequacy of alternatives to protect interests served by the
protective order. 194
While the presumption in favor of the right of access would still be
strong, these factors could be considered by courts when reviewing
whether an agency reclassification is proper. Although this approach
would lead to less-frequent disclosures of reclassified information, it
would still lead to more disclosures than the current approach.
The "mere factor" approach, for the reasons it is not adhered to by
a majority of the circuit courts in the protective order context, is
unlikely to change the net result of the current standard. As one factor
in a multi-factored analysis, the right of access would often be
trumped by national security concerns.
Whichever approach courts take, the information ultimately
protected must truly endanger national security. Although courts
have historically shown significant deference when it comes to
Exemption 1 decisions, reclassification of information in the public
domain is a new issue that is dramatically different from the cases
under which courts developed the current deferential approach.
Federal agencies should not be given unfettered discretion to make
reclassification decisions and then be permitted to rely on out-of-
context judicial standards to sandbag the courts into protecting
information that is reclassified for the sole purpose of unnecessary
secrecy. In the same manner that the reviewing courts require with
protective orders, the protected information must be narrowly tailored
e.g., Poliquin v. Garden Way, 989 F.2d 527,533 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing national security as
one of the rare exceptions where material introduced at trial may be safeguarded against
subsequent disclosure).
193 Courts have held that prior access to information by the party requesting dissemination
is a factor favoring further release of the materials. See, e.g., Myers, 635 F.2d at 952
("Once the evidence has become known to the members of the public, including
representatives of the press, through their attendance at a public session of court, it would
take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of
those not physically in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evidence, when it is
in a form that readily permits sight and sound reproduction."); United States v. Webbe, 791
F.2d 103, 1o6 (8th Cir. 1986) (endorsing district court's consideration of certain factors,
including the fact that the news media had attended the trial and pre-trial hearings, had
reported the events of the trial to the public, and had received transcripts of the tapes);
United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging as a factor
"whether the press has already been permitted substantial access to the contents of the
records").
194 See, e.g., Nat'l Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 425 (6th Cir.
1981) ("[T]here must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which
intrudes less directly on expression.").
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to impose the minimum restraint necessary to protect the interest
concerned.195
C. POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
While reworking the current scheme and offering requesters more
protection in judicial review of FOIA requests would provide better
protection against this practice than the practices currently in place,
legislative action is by far the best way to curb the increasing number
of reclassifications. Not only does the legislature have the ability to
engage in more meaningful and rigorous discussion on the matter, it
also has the ability to restrict the discretion left to agencies by the
Bush Order. Although there is no existing provision in FOIA for
legislative review of the controlling Executive Order or memorandum,
changes can be implemented through amendments to the Act itself or
new legislation that seeks to limit agency discretion when it attempts
to reclassify documents already in the public domain.196
In August 2007, Congress took an important step toward
increasing public access to documents and limiting agency discretion
in general by passing the OPEN Government Act of 2007.197 The Act
created the Office of Government Information Services ("OGIS"), a
new division within the National Archives and Records
Administration to be headed by a FOIA ombudsman who would have
been responsible for, inter alia, mediating FOIA disputes and
monitoring agency implementation of FOIA.198 However, despite
signing the law in December 2007, President Bush failed to fund the
195 See id. ("The restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise."); United States v.
Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 414 (6th Cir. 1986) ("trial court's discretion [to deny access] must
be narrowly restricted.").
196 Despite efforts in the io8th and lo9th Congresses to reverse the effect of the Bush
Executive Order, and the Ashcroft and Card memoranda, such efforts have been largely
unsuccessful. See Restore Open Government Act of 2004, H.R. 5073, lo8th Cong. (2004)
(creating a presumption in favor of disclosure and expressly repudiating the Ashcroft and
Card memoranda); Restore Open Government Act of 2005, H.R. 2331, logth Cong. (2005)
(reintroducing Restore Open Government Act of 2004). See also OPEN Government Act of
2005, S. 394, 9ogth Cong. (2005); Faster FOIA Act of 2005, S. 589, 1ogth Cong. (2005).
197 OPEN Government Act of 2007, S. 2488, ioth Cong. (2007) (enacted), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=llocong_
bills&docid=f:s2488enr.txt.pdf.
198 Id. § 10.
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program in his 2009 budget proposal, and proposed shifting the
ombudsman's position to the Department of Justice.199
Senator Patrick J. Leahy called the move a blatant attempt by
President Bush "to act contrary to the express intent of Congress" in
light of the fact that he and Senator John Cornyn "intentionally placed
this critical office in the National Archive, so that OGIS would be free
from the influence of the Federal agency that litigates FOIA disputes-
the Department of Justice."200 It is undisputable that OGIS would
have helped prevent agency reclassification practices. With an
independent, non-political watchdog overseeing agency
classifications, agencies might have been more hesitant when making
improper reclassification decisions in the first place. In addition, the
mediation aspect of OGIS would have provided FOIA requesters who
were improperly denied access to declassified information with an
expeditious resolution of their dispute. It is unclear what will happen
with OGIS and FOIA ombudsman, but the provisions of the Act are an
important step in the effort to stop improper reclassification
practices.201
The OPEN Government Act of 2007, however, is just one of many
necessary steps to ensure that agency reclassification decisions are
curtailed. Even assuming that Senator Leahy successfully secures
funding for the OGIS, Congress should further amend FOIA to limit
agency discretion to reclassify information already in the public
domain. While this Comment deals primarily with reclassifications
under Exemption 1, it is likely that documents are being reclassified
under other exemptions as well. Yet there is no provision in FOIA
legislation itself forbidding agencies from reclassifying documents
after they have been in the public domain. If the legislature were to
amend FOIA to impose its own restrictions on reclassification, it
would first need to define "public disclosure" more broadly than the
courts have defined it in the past.20 2
199 Elizabeth Williamson, Is Ombudsman Already in Jeopardy? Bush Proposes Moving
Post from Archives to Justice Dept., WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2o08, at A17.
200 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Call
for Full Funding of the Office of Government Information Services,
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/2oo8o2/o214o8a.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
20, In his statement, Senator Leahy vowed that the OGIS would be "promptly established
and fully funded within the National Archives." Id.
202 See Afshar v. Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Founding Church of
Scientology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 61o F.2d 824, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("Well publicized .... "); Lamont v. Dep't of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
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While expounding on its Public Domain Doctrine, the judiciary
failed to take into account the pervasiveness of the Internet. In 2001,
the D.C. Circuit conceded that "a disclosure made to any FOIA
requester is effectively a disclosure to the world at large," and that
there is no authority to "limit the dissemination of the documents that
are released under FOIA, or to choose selectively among recipients."203
Surely this reasoning can be applied when information is disclosed on
the Internet as well. In addition, the provision would need to set a
time limit on an agency's ability to reclassify once information is
released into the public domain. Finally, the provision should include
de novo review with minimal deference given to the agency where the
requester offers adequate proof-the location of the information, the
date the information was accessed, and a general description of the
information itself-that the information was previously in the public
domain but has been subsequently removed.
Allowing the executive branch to determine the appropriate
reclassification procedures is not acceptable when the executive
branch often has ulterior motives that favor secrecy over disclosure.
An amendment to FOIA itself would allow the legislature to take a
firm stand on a practice that is dangerously undermining FOIA. The
Bush Order provides fairly vague restrictions on reclassification;
whereas, a legislative amendment to FOIA would provide agencies
with clear guidelines that will ultimately reduce the ability of federal
agencies to remove information from the public domain in the first
place. Such legislative action is needed to send agencies a clear
message that reclassifying documents and removing them from the
public domain are not actions intended by those who fought for FOIA.
V. CONCLUSION
Since its inception, FOIA has had to strike a complex balance
between national security concerns and public disclosure. Achieving
this balance became even more difficult when terrorists attacked
America on American soil.2o4 On September lith, America learned
that it is not invincible. In the age of terrorism, it is absolutely
necessary to protect national security. But legitimately protecting the
("Specifically revealed to the public .... "); Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir.
1999) ("[d]isclosed and preserved in a permanent public record"); Davis v. Dep't of Justice,
968 F.2d 1276, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("officially acknowledged" or in the "public domain").
203 Students Against Genocide v. Dep't of State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
204 See FOIA Hearing, supra note 13.
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nation's security is far different from unnecessary secrecy. If security
within America's boundaries comes at the price of the right to an open
and honest government, then the terrorists win. As the 9/11
Commission concluded, only "publicity" could have "derailed the
attacks."205 The Commission's purpose was to determine what led to
the terrorist attacks. The proper response to its findings is more
openness, not more secrecy.
Few papers carried the story about the Cold War missile blackout.
In fact, there has been very little media coverage on the increasing
reclassification of documents already in the public domain. Such
practices pose a grave danger to FOIA with little or no benefit to
national security. It is important that a strict stance is taken against
agency practices implementing an unnecessary degree of secrecy.
Without a strong stance, America stands to lose much more than
FOIA.
205 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 247, 276, 541 n.107.
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